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ARGUMENT 
Applying Utah law to the facts of this case consistently confirms that RADC and 
Utah First lack an identity of interest sufficient for the application of the relation back 
doctrine. Further, under equitable principals and by the terms of Dos Lagos's 1 agreement, 
any judgment awarded to RADC must be limited to its proportional 48% ownership 
interest in the Note. 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT FOUND THAT RADC 
AND UTAH FIRST HAD AN IDENTITY OF INTEREST. 
Utah law consistently confirms that the court of appeals incorrectly held that 
RADC and Utah First share an identity of interest sufficient to trigger the relation back 
doctrine in Rule 15(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
First, despite RADC's attempt to distinguish it, the facts of the recent case, 
Highlands at Jordanelle, LLC v. Wasatch County, are actually quite similar to those in 
the instant case and indicate that RADC 's claims do not relate back to Utah First's 
complaint. In the Highlands case, Pigeonhole Development, LLC purchased the right to 
bring claims on behalf of Prime West Jordanelle, LLC and filed its first complaint in 
November 2010. Highlands at Jordanelle, LLC v. Wasatch County, 2015 UT App 173, ~ 
47, 355 P.3d 1047. A year later, Pigeonhole purchased additional claims from PWJ 
Holdings, LLC and then attempted to amend its complaint to include the new claims. Id. 
The district court declined to allow the amended complaint to relate back to the first 
1 In keeping with the style of Petitioners' opening brief, "Dos Lagos" is used throughout 
to collectively refer to all of the Petitioners. Likewise, "RADC" is used throughout to 
refer to the Respondent. 
1 
complaint under Rule 15(c), because "Pigeonhole as successor in interest to PWJ's 
claims does not share an identity of interest with Pigeonhole as successor in interest to 
the claims of Prime West." Id. 
In reviewing the case, the court of appeals reiterated the rule that "under limited 
circumstances, a new party may relate its claim back to the original complaint in the 
event of a 'misnomer case' or ifthere is a 'true identity of interest' between the new party 
and the original party." Id. at~ 48 (quoting Wright v. PK Transp., 2015 UT App 93, ~ 5, 
325 P.3d 894). According to the Highlands court, there are two elements to a "true 
identity of interest": 
(1) the amended pleading alleged only claims that arose out of the conduct, 
transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original 
pleading; and 
(2) the defendant had received actual or constructive notice that the new plaintiff 
would have been a proper party to the original pleading such that no prejudice 
would result from preventing the defendant from using a statute-of-limitations 
defense that otherwise would have been available. 
Id. at~ 49 (quoting Ottens v. McNeil, 2010 UT App 237, ~ 43, 239 P.3d 308) (other 
internal citations and quotations omitted). 
Pigeonhole attempted to argue that its amended complaint did not add a new party. 
The court of appeals, though, rejected this argument: 
[W]e consider plaintiffs who have purchased their claims to have stepped into the 
shoes of the fonner plaintiff. Pigeonhole has, in effect, purchased the right to step 
into the shoes of Prime West and PWJ. Therefore, Pigeonhole's effort to amend its 
complaint to add the PWJ claims does attempt to add a new party. 
Id. at~ 50 (internal citations omitted). After so holding, the court noted that Pigeonhole's 
PWJ claims would be time barred "unless Pigeonhole can show that PWJ has a true 
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identity of interest with Prime West independent oftheir connection via Pigeonhole." Id. 
(emphasis added). 
Next, the court looked at the first prong of the identity of interest test: whether the 
new claims "arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to 
be set forth in the original pleading. Id. at ,-r 51 (internal citations omitted). The original 
complaint dealt with fees the Fire District imposed on property owned by Prime West. 
Thereafter, PWJ purchased the property from Prime West, after which time the Fire 
District also imposed additional fees on the same property. I d. The court of appeals held 
that the PWJ claims "concern a separate act of misconduct directed against a separate 
plaintiff," that "[a]llegations of new or different actions of misconduct amount to new 
claims that cannot relate back to the original complaint," and, therefore, that the PWJ 
claims "fail the first element of the identity-of-interest test." I d. at ,-r,-r 51-52. The court 
then affirmed the district court's ruling that the new claims could not relate back to the 
original claims under Rule 15(c). Id. at ,-r 52. 2 
Following the reasoning and analysis in the Highlands at Jordanelle case, it is 
clear that RADC's claims do not relate back to Utah First's original complaint. First, the 
amended complaints clearly add a new party, RADC, where there was only one plaintiff, 
Utah First, in the original complaint. RADC's claims are therefore time barred unless 
RADC can show that it has a true identity of interest with Utah First, independent of their 
2 Having found that the PWJ claims did not meet the first requirement of the identity of 
interest test, the court did not consider the second requirement. Id. at ,-r 52. 
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connection via the participation agreement. 3 
Next, the first prong of the identity of interest tests requires that Utah First's and 
RADC's claims arise "out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or 
attempted to be set forth in the original pleading." At first glance, this appears to be the 
case. However, it is helpful to review the facts of the Highlands at Jordanelle case. 
There, the fees were all imposed on the same property, and yet the court held that the 
claims were separate and distinct because the fees were assessed against and paid by 
separate entities. Here, the claims arise from the same Note. However, Utah First's 
claims and RADC's claims are separate and distinct because they each own only a 
percentage of the Note. The original complaint only set forth Utah First's own claims to 
52% of the amount due under the Note. Thus, the addition ofRADC and its new claims, 
for its 48% of the amount due under the Note, allege new or different acts of misconduct 
and therefore cannot relate back to the original complaint. 
Further, even ifRADC's claims meet the first prong ofthe identity of interest test, 
it fails the second prong: the defendants, Dos Lagos, did not receive actual or 
constructive notice that RADC would have been a proper party to the original pleading 
such that no prejudice would result from preventing Dos Lagos from using a statute-of-
limitations defense that otherwise would have been available. This stems from the simple 
fact that RADC and Utah First have no connection outside of the purchase agreement, 
and "privity of contract alone is an insufficient identity of interest for relation back under 
3 RADC argues that the "issue of privity of contract does not really apply" to this case, 
without citing to any case or law that allows it to disregard this important aspect of the 
identity of interest test. (Brief of Respondent at 14-15.) 
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rule 15(c)." Russell v. Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263, 265 (Utah 1995). 
RADC's argument throughout its brief, is that the "complaint has always sought 
the deficiency for the unpaid Note" and that Dos Lagos has "been on notice since the 
initial pleading that that was the relief sought." (Brief of Respondent at 10.) RADC even 
goes so far as to claim that there "was no attempt to ... seek a percentage of a 
deficiency." (Id. at 13.) However, this claim is outright false. RADC seems to have 
conveniently forgotten that the original complaint, timely filed by Utah First, sought only 
Utah First's proportional percentage of the deficiency, not the total amount of the 
deficiency on the Note. (R. 303-334.) Even RADC admits that the original complaint 
filed by Utah First "took into account only Utah First's 52% interest in the Note." (Brief 
of Respondent at 8, ,-r 28.) Thus, Dos Lagos has been on notice since the original 
complaint that Utah First sought a deficiency for its proportional share of the debt. Dos 
Lagos was not on notice that RADC intended to seek a deficiency for its proportional 
share of the debt. This is not a "misnomer case" and there is no "true identity of interest" 
between Utah First and RADC. By failing to bring an action within the time allowed by 
statute, RADC failed to preserve its claims. Allowing RADC to resurrect its claims now 
would severely prejudice Dos Lagos. 
Second, RADC' s attempts to distinguish the three cases set forth in Dos Lagos's 
opening brief are ineffectual. Yes, those three cases deal with the attempted addition of a 
defendant rather than a plaintiff. And yes, the fact scenarios are different from the one in 
this case, but there will almost never be two cases with identical facts. The three cases, 
Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co., Russell v. Standard Corp., and VCS, Inc. v. Utah 
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Community Bank, all set forth and follow the analysis necessary to detem1ine whether the 
addition of a new party can relate back to the filing of the original complaint under Rule 
15(c). Following that analysis indicates that RADC's claims do not relate back to the 
filing of the original complaint. 
In Perry, the claims all arose from some defective doors. Perry v. Pioneer 
Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d 214, 216 (Utah 1984). The general contractor originally 
sued the subcontractor and later wanted to bring in the supplier and the manufacturer. 
The court went through the same analysis. First, it was detem1ined that the supplier and 
the manufacturer were obviously new parties. Id. at 216-217. Next, the court determined 
whether the new parties had an identity of interest with the original party. It determined 
that the parties did not have any relationship outside of privity of contract, which is 
"insufficient" for the purpose of Rule 15(c). Id. at 217. The analysis is the same for 
RADC and Utah First. Set forth in detail above, the short of it is that RADC and Utah 
First's claims both arose from the Note. However, they do not have any relationship 
outside of the participation agreement, i.e., privity of contract, which is insufficient for 
the purpose of Rule 15(c). 
In Russell, the claims all arose from the publication of one article. Russell v. 
Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263, 263-264 (Utah 1995). Having brought claims against two 
newspapers, the plaintiff sought to bring in another newspaper defendant. The comi went 
through the same analysis. First, the new newspaper was clearly a new party, so the court 
next determined whether the new newspaper had an identity of interest with the 
newspapers from the original complaint. Again, the court found that the newspapers, 
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though they all published the exact same article, did not have any connection outside of 
contractual agreements, which is, again, "insufficient ... for relation back under rule 
15(c)." Id. at 265. Again, the analysis is the same for RADC and Utah First. They lack 
any connection sufficient to establish an identity of interest. 
Finally, in VCS, the claims all arose from a construction contract. The contractor 
sued the developer for payment and later attempted to bring in the financing bank. VCS, 
Inc. v. Utah Community Bank, 2012 UT 89, ~ 26,293 P.3d 290. With the financing bank 
a new party, the court went, as it should have, to the identity of interest analysis. Again, 
the court found that the developer and the financing bank had no connection sufficient to 
establish an identity of interest and that "[ o ]ur precedent accordingly forecloses VCS' s 
assertion that [the two defendants] shared an identity of interest based on their contractual 
relationship. Id. at 27. And again, this is the same analysis (and result) that applies to 
RADC and Utah First. 
In sum, in light of clear Utah law, the amended complaints attempted to add a new 
party, RADC, and new claims, RADC's 48% of the deficiency. Those claims cannot 
relate back to the original complaint, because Utah First and RADC have no true identity 
of interest. Thus, this Court should reverse the court of appeals and dismiss RADC' s 
claims against Dos Lagos with prejudice. 
II. IF APPLIED, NEWLY AMENDED RULE lS(C) ALSO INDICATES THAT 
RADC'S CLAIMS DO NOT RELATE BACK TO THE ORIGINAL 
COMPLAINT. 
The new version of Rule 15 does not save RADC's tardy claims. The revised Rule 
15(c) went into effect November 1, 2016. The new version adopts the federal rule and 
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specifically allows for the relation back doctrine to apply to a new party under certain 
circumstances. Utah R. Civ. P. 15(c) (2016). 
Generally, under Utah law, statutes and rules4 do not "operate retrospectively 
unless the legislature has clearly expressed that intention" or the statute or rule "changes 
only procedural law by providing a different mode or form of procedure for enforcing 
substantive rights without enlarging or eliminating vested rights." Beaver Cty. v. Utah 
State Tax Comm 'n, 2010 UT 50,~ 10, 254 P.3d 158 (internal citations and quotations 
omitted). Thus, a rule may be retroactively applied if it is "enacted subsequent to the 
initiation of a suit which does not enlarge, eliminate, or destroy vested or contractual 
rights." Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
Here, the approved amendment to Rule 15( c) was explicitly noted to be "effective 
November 1, 2016." Utah R. Civ. P. 15(c) (2016). Further, Utah courts have "consistently 
maintained that the defense of an expired statute of limitations is a vested right." Roark v. 
Crabtree, 893 P.2d 1058, 1062 (Utah 1995). Since Rule 15(c)'s provisions explicitly 
apply to the operation of claims in relation to the defense of expired statutes of limitation, 
the rule is substantive and should not be applied retroactively. 
However, even if it is found to be a procedural change and is applied to the facts 
of this case, the new version of Rule 15(c) essentially codifies the analysis contained in 
Utah's cases on the subject. The new provision provides as follows: 
(c) Relation back of amendments. An amendment to a pleading relates back to the 
4 "[W]e hold that the same substantive analysis may be applied to either statutes or rules 
in determining the appropriateness of retroactivity." Beaver Cty. v. Utah State Tax 
Comm 'n, 2010 UT 50,~ 10 n.5, 254 P.3d 158. 
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date of the original pleading when: 
( c )(3) the amendment adds a party, substitutes a party, or changes the name 
of the party against whom a claim is asserted, if paragraph (c)(2) is satisfied 
and if, within the period provided by Rule 4(b) for serving the summons 
and complaint, the party to be brought in by amendment: 
(c)(3)(A) received such notice of the action that it will not be 
prejudiced in defending on the merits; and 
(c)(3)(B) knew or should have known that the action would have 
been brought against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper 
party's identity. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 15(c) (2016). Paragraph (c)(2) provides as follows: "the amendment 
asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set 
out-or attempted to be set out-in the original pleading." Utah R. Civ. P. 15(c)(2). Rule 
4(b) requires that a complaint be "served no later than 120 days after the complaint is 
filed." Utah R. Civ. P. 4(b). 
Reduced to its requirements, the new version demands that the following three 
elements be met, within 120 days of the filing of the original complaint, in order for 
relation back to apply to a new plaintiff: 
(1) "the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, 
transaction, or occurrence set out-or attempted to be set out-in the original 
pleading"; 
(2) defendants "received such notice of the action that it will not be prejudiced in 
defending on the merits"; and 
(3) defendants "knew or should have known that the action would have been 
brought against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper party's identity."5 
5 "The relation back of amendments changing plaintiffs is not expressly treated in revised 
Rule 15(c) since the problem is generally easier. Again the chief consideration of policy 
is that of the statute oflimitations, and the attitude taken in revised Rule 15(c) toward 
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Utah R. Civ. P. 15(c). In considering these requirements, many courts use an identity of 
interest test similar to that employed in the Utah cases. See, e.g., Young v. Lepone, 305 
F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2002); In re Syntex Corp. Sec. Litig., 95 F.3d 922, 935 (9th Cir. 
1996). 
In Young v. Lepone, the court considered whether individual shareholders of a 
corporation had a sufficient identity of interest to permit relation back under the federal 
rule. The court followed a similar analysis to those in the Utah cases discussed above, 
ultimately found that the shareholders did not have an identity of interest, and explicitly 
rejected the argument that notice of an action by one plaintiff extended notice of an 
action by a separate plaintiff: 
We repudiate the conceit that an action filed by one plaintiff gives a defendant 
notice of the impending joinder of any or all similarly situated plaintiffs. Such a 
rule would undermine applicable statutes of limitations and make a mockery of the 
promise of repose. We, like other courts, flatly reject the proposition that relation 
back is available merely because a new plaintiffs claims arise from the same 
transaction or occurrence as the original plaintiffs claims. 
Young, 305 F.3d at 15-16. The court acknowledged that the language in the federal rule 
does not explicitly apply to adding new plaintiffs but noted that "it suggests that when a 
new plaintiff attempts to enter a pending action under the aegis of Rule 15( c )(3), courts 
should require substantial structural and corporate overlap to ensure that the defendant is 
not called upon to defend against new facts and issues." Id. at 15. Reaching the merits of 
the issue, then, the court held that "[p ]ersons who are identified with each other only by 
change of defendants extends by analogy to amendments changing plaintiffs." Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 15 (1966 Advisory Committee Notes). 
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their ownership of stock in the same publicly-traded corporation share some of the same 
rights, but that fact, standing alone, does not place them in the kind of proximity needed 
to invoke Rule 15(c)(3)." Id. 
The three requirements of the new Rule 15(c), as it relates to relation back of new 
parties and as interpreted by federal courts, mirrors the requirements of Utah law 
discussed above. It therefore follows that the result is the same: RADC does not qualify 
for relation back. Like the shareholders in Young, RADC and Utah First are identified 
with each other only by their ownership in the same note. They share some of the same 
rights, but that fact, standing alone, does not place them in the kind of proximity needed 
to invoke Rule 15(c). 
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT AFFIRMED RADC'S 
JUDGMENT OF 100% OF THE AMOUNT DUE. 
Both equitable principles and contractual provisions indicate that any judgment 
awarded to RADC must be limited to RADC's 48% ownership interest in the Note. 
Equitably, it makes little sense to award RADC a judgment for 100% of the 
deficiency left on the Note, when it owns only a 48% interest in that Note. As noted in 
Petitioner's opening brief, RADC's 48% share of the amount due on the Note is 
approximately $1 ,644,816.92, and where RADC received the foreclosed property worth 
$1,510,000.00, RADC is left with just $134,816.92 owed to it. In this context, awarding 
RADC judgments of almost $3 million is inequitable. RADC, of course, argues that it is 
accountable to Utah First for any funds it collects in excess of the amount due to it. 
However, this is inequitable too, where Utah First lost its motion for summary judgment 
11 
and dismissed its claims against Dos Lagos. 
Further, contractual provisions, found in the Business Loan Agreement and the 
Participation Agreement, indicate that RADC must be limited to its 48% share of the 
Note. RADC hangs its hat on language that a loan participant "may enforce borrower's 
obligation under the loan irrespective of failure or insolvency of any holder of any 
interest in the loan." (R. 771.) There are two problems with reliance on this provision 
alone. First, the condition in the provision has not been met: Utah First has not failed or 
become insolvent. Second, when read in the context of other provisions, it becomes clear 
that a participant may enforce the borrower's obligation only up to its percentage of 
ownership. Here is the provision in full: 
Consent to Loan Participation. Borrower agrees and consents to Lender's sale or 
transfer, whether now or later, of one or more participation interests in the Loan to 
one or more purchasers, whether related or unrelated to Lender. Lender may 
provide, without any limitation whatsoever, to any one or more purchasers, or 
potential purchases, any information or knowledge Lender may have about 
Borrower or about any other matter relating to the Loan, and Borrower hereby 
waives any rights to privacy Borrower may have with respect to such matters. 
Borrower also agrees that the purchasers of any such participation interests will be 
considered as the absolute owners of such interest in the Loan and will have all the 
rights granted under the participation agreement or agreements governing the sale 
of such participation interests. Borrower further waives all rights of offset or 
counterclaim that it may have now or later against Lender or against any purchaser 
of such a participation interest and unconditionally agrees that either Lender or 
such purchaser may enforce Borrower's obligation under the Loan irrespective of 
the failure or insolvency of any holder of any interest in the Loan. Borrower 
further agrees that the purchaser of any such participation interests may enforce its 
interests irrespective of any personal claims or defenses that Borrower may have 
against Lender. 
(R. 771 (emphasis added).) When read in context, it becomes clear that a loan 
participation agreement cleaves the Note in two (or more) pieces. A participant "may 
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enforce its interests," and the participant, as an "absolute owner" of its percentage 
ownership interest, may do so "irrespective of any personal claims or defenses that 
Borrower may have against Lender."6 Thus, the participant's rights are conceptually 
separate from those of the original lender. 
Further, the participation agreement limits American West Bank's (and therefore 
RADC's) participation to the principal amount of "$1,200,000.00." (R. 556.) RADC 
collected more than that when it obtained the foreclosed property, and the district court's 
judgments grant RADC the right to collect almost an additional $3 million. The 
judgments violate the clear contractual provisions governing the parties. 
This court should therefore reverse the holding of the court of appeals and hold 
that RADC is entitled to only its pro rata share of the loan. 
6 Again, as the drafter of the agreements, any ambiguities are construed against America 
West Bank and its successor, RADC. See, e.g., Express Recovery Servs., Inc. v. Rice, 
2005 UT App 495, ~ 3, 125 P.3d 108. 
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CONCLUSION 
Therefore, Petitioners respectfully request that this Court reverse the court of 
appeals, dismiss RADC's claims as untimely, set aside RADC's judgments, and award 
Petitioners their attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to both statute and the contracts at 
issue in this case. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 18th day ofNovember 2016. 
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